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Abstract
This paper gives an account of events, and explains some system-
atic reasons of the UMTS auction flop in Switzerland. Apart from
general market developments, which could not have been antici-
pated, we argue that auction design which was introduced in Eng-
land and adopted in Switzerland and elsewhere is a cause of the
disappointing performance of many UMTS auctions in Europe, of
which Switzerland is just one particularly pronounced example.
The regulator would have been better advised to import some key
ingredients of the auction design employed in Germany and Aus-
tria. This would have assured higher revenue or more competition.
The paper closes with several proposals on how one should con-
duct future spectrum auctions.
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1 Introduction
In some European countries the year 2000 will be remembered as the year
of huge windfalls of tax revenue from their auctioning of third-generation
(UMTS) spectrum frequencies for mobile communications. These auc-
tions flooded €37.5 billion into the UK, and the record sum of €50.8 bil-
lion into the German treasury — four to five times as much as the staff
of the German finance minister had expected.
However, this fountain of tax revenue dried out as quickly as it had
erupted. Already before the still very successful German auction took
place, the auction in the Netherlands closed at shockingly low prices.
Interest in third-generation spectrum frequencies further stalled in sub-
sequent auctions in Austria and in particular in Italy, which has one of
the most profitable mobile phone markets in Europe. And as if this were
not enough disappointment, the year ended with a flop in Switzerland,
where revenue dropped to a nominal level, and the regulator desperately
though in vain tried to patch up last minute changes in auction rules.
The present paper gives an account of events, puts the Swiss auction into
a larger perspective, and explains some of the systematic reasons of auc-
tion design that may explain the Swiss UMTS auction flop. Apart from
other aspects and current developments in telecom markets, we argue
that the English design, which was adopted in most European countries
including Switzerland, systematically gives rise to insufficient participa-
tion in the auction. After the main battles for the pan-European field
have been settled, auctions with that design attract only the strongest
bidders, and the number of bidders tends to be equal to the number of
available licenses, as it did occur in Switzerland. By contrast, the auc-
tion design adopted in Germany does not completely predetermine the
number and size of licenses and induces more competition. This design
should perform better in the face of costly bidder participation, which
indeed it did.
Nevertheless, both auction designs applied in Europe are far from per-
fect, and one should work out and test better mechanisms to be adopted
in future frequency auctions. This may be particular urgent in the U.S.,
where third-generation frequencies become available at a larger scale as
soon as the licenses of television stations, that currently occupy these
frequencies, expire.
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2 What Happened?
Everything looked very promising when the Swiss Federal Office of Com-
munications screened prospective bidders for the upcoming UMTS auc-
tion. Altogether, 10 applicants qualified to bid for 4 identical licenses.
This seemed like ample competition. And considering that each license
was generously endowed with 2× 15 MHz paired (plus 5 MHz unpaired)
frequencies (more than in many other European countries), and that
Switzerland is an attractive high income market, the auction promised a
respectable outcome, to say the least.1
However, as the date of the auction approached, a major bidder melt-
down was on its way. Just one week before the auction only 8 bidders
were left; by Friday, that number had further melted down to 5; over the
weekend another bidder withdrew; and so, on Monday morning, Novem-
ber 13, when the auction was scheduled to take place, only four bidders
showed up to bid for four licenses.2
At this point the Federal Office of Communication panicked, called–off
the auction, and announced that the auction will take place at an as yet
unspecified future date, probably under somewhat different rules. Of
course, the Swiss public was disappointed about the unexpected loss of
tax revenue, and both the industry and the financial press questioned
the legitimacy of last minute meddling with auction rules. During the
subsequent weeks, several bidders threatened to go to court, and, finally,
the regulator subdued, and carried out the auction at unchanged rules,
on December 6, 2000.
The result was as expected: the four licenses were awarded at nominal
prices to the four bidders dSpeed (associate company of diAX), Orange
Communications, Swisscom, and Team3G (Telefonica). Each bidder paid
the minimum bid of 50 Million Swiss Franks, except for Orange, who paid
an extra 5 Million increment. (Orange bid higher in order to assure itself
a particular frequency that matches the frequency it already acquired in
a neighboring country.)
Interestingly, there were three incumbents in the Swiss mobile phone
market: Swisscom, Orange, and diAX, one of which (diAX) merged with
1Incidentally, the Swiss engaged Charles River Associates Inc. as auction designer
and administrator.
2The following approved candidates withdrew prior to the auction: Teldotcom,
Telenor Mobile Communications, Cablecom Management, Hutchinson 3G Europe, and
T-Mobile International. Sunrise also withdrew after its merger with diAX.
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the service provider Sunrise to formdSpeed (under the direction of TeleDan-
mark), just before the auction. Therefore, after the UMTS auction one
new entrant, Team3G (Telefonica), had entered into the Swiss market.
With licenses in Spain, the UK, Germany, and Switzerland, Telefonica has
established itself as a pan–European provider.
In order to put the Swiss auction into perspective, Table 1 summarizes
the European auctions, in chronological order. The first column states
the country (a star indicates that the German auction design was applied;
all other countries applied the English rules). The second column states
the month(s) when the UMTS auction took place, the third the number
of bidders, the fourth the number of licenses, the fifth the number of
incumbents,3 and the last the revenue per population unit. Evidently,
England raised the highest revenue per population unit, closely followed
by Germany. However, considering that the English market has a higher
penetration rate and thus is more profitable, and that Germany achieved
a more competitive market structure (six vs. five licenses), it is fair to
say that the German auction was the most successful.
Table 1: UMTS Auctions in Europa in the Year 2000
Where When # Bidders #Licenses #Incumb. €/Pop
UK 03/04 13 5 4 630
Netherlands 07 9/6 5 5 170
Germany* 07/08 12/7 4-6 4 615
Italy 10 8/6 5 4 210
Austria* 10 6 4-6 4 103
Switzerland 11/12 10/4 4 3 19
The “bidder meltdown” and subsequent low revenue in auctions that em-
ployed the English design, which reached a high point in the year 2000
in Switzerland, extended also into the year 2001. It occurred in Belgium,
where the auctionwas subsequently cancelled, and three of the four avail-
able licenses were then sold in early March 2001 at a fixed price.4 Sim-
ilarly, in Israel, the auction has been postponed due to an insufficient
number of bidders. Both Belgium and Israel also employed the English
3In Switzerland the number of incumbents dropped from 4 to 3 during the prepa-
ration for the auction, due to the merger between Sunrise and diAX.
4Three licenses were issued to Belgacom, Mobistar, and KPN Orange.
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design. The revenue in Belgium was €450 Million, which amounts to the
ridiculously low level of €/Pop 44.
3 Which Auction Design?
In all third-generation (UMTS) spectrum auctions in Europe the supply
of frequencies was more or less the same: a total band of 2 × 60 MHz
(paired) frequencies,5 plus some 20 MHz (in some countries 15 MHz) of
unpaired frequencies.6 Also, everybody employed the same simultane-
ous, ascending price auction format, which is well-known ever since the
first spectrum auctions took place in the US.
However, there was one important broad difference between the different
designs: Whereas the English auctioned a fixed number of licenses, each
prepackaged with certain amounts of radio spectrum, the German reg-
ulator broke down the supply of paired frequencies into identical pack-
ages, and allowed bidders to aggregate frequency packages into a vari-
able number of licenses, essentially ranging from 4 to 6 licenses.7 Thus,
England completely specified the market structure, setting both the num-
ber and size of licenses, whereas Germany let the market decide, within
narrow limits.
With the exception of Austria, which followed the German example, all
other European regulators basically copied the English design. Switzer-
land introduced a small deviation by choosing only four (rather than five)
more generously endowed licenses, and by making all licenses identical.
5Spectrum is paired because one is used to send and the other to receive informa-
tion. To see why this is important, just listen to radio communication in a taxi cab;
there, only one party is able to speak, until the line is freed for the other party to
respond.
6At the time of the auction, the unpaired frequencies were viewed as supplementary
and of uncertain usefulness, which is why we ignore them here.
7Precisely twelve 2× 5 MHz packages were supplied, and bidders were allowed to
aggregate frequencies into up to six licenses (endowed with at least two and at most
four 2×10 MHz). The auction was actually a sequential two auctions game: in the first
auction, bidders could only bid on either three or two packages; any packages left-over
from the first stage would have been auctioned in a second auction, where bidders
could bid on only one frequency. Due to these restrictions, the relevant outcomes
were either 4 or 5 or 6 licenses, even though an outcome with less than 4 licenses was
conceivable in theory, though not in practice. For a detailed account and analysis of
the German third-generation (UMTS) auction see Grimm, Riedel, and Wolfstetter
[2001b].
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Nevertheless, Switzerland followed the “one more license than incum-
bents” principle, which was only violated in the Netherlands (see Table
1).8
4 Why Revenue Matters
The Federal Office of Communications emphasized that efficiency was its
foremost concern. However, tax revenue also mattered. Indeed, next to
efficiency, the stated objective was to “establish market value”, and the
Federal Office of Communications nourished the expectation that ”the
auction is likely to raise the optimal revenue”, even though “raising auc-
tion revenue by itself is not a primary objective” (FederalOfficeofCom-
munications [2000, p. 5]).
And indeed, revenue should matter a great deal, for the following reason:
The revenue from the efficient sale of radio spectrum is one of those rare
examples of a distortion–free tax. Most other taxes, from sales to income
tax, exert enormous efficiency distortions. Feldstein [1995] estimated
that every $ 1 increase in tax revenue, raised through an across the board
increase in income taxes, causes a dramatic $ 2 welfare loss to society,
mostly due to wasteful efforts to avoid or reduce taxes. The government
has to finance its expenditures, one way or the other. Therefore, one
should make full use of every opportunity to replace standard taxes by
distortion–free methods of revenue collection.
The bottom line is that, even if efficiency is the primary objective, one
should sell radio spectrum by a mechanism that maximizes revenue in
the class of efficient mechanisms. Generally, this leads to a generalized
Clark-Groves auction mechanism (see Krishna and Perry [1998]). How-
ever, since alternative taxes entail an enormous welfare loss, it is even
optimal to accept some deviation from efficiency if this gives rise to more
revenue.9
Altogether, the importance of revenue is not sufficiently appreciated by
auction designers,10 even though financeministers and the general public
judge the success of spectrum auctions by their revenue.
8Klemperer [2000] claims that the deviation from this principle was responsible
for the embarrassingly low revenue in the Netherlands.
9For optimal regulatory mechanisms in the face of a high deadweight loss of al-
ternative taxes, see Dana and Spier [1994] and Grimm, Riedel, and Wolfstetter
[2000]).
10An early notable exception is Rothkopf and Harstad [1990].
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5 Why Interest in UMTS Frequencies Stalled
Several developments explain why interest in third-generation frequen-
cies has stalled, after the first success stories in England and Germany.
The enormous cost involved in buying frequencies and building new net-
works of base stations, combined with uncertain revenue projections
have begun to worry investors. As debts have grown and overall tech-
nology stocks have plummeted, several telecom companies already ex-
perienced the downgrading of their debt. Having reached a borrowing
constraint, telecom companies increasingly turn to the builders of net-
work equipment for trade credits.11
Building third-generation networks and marketing and billing the new
services is enormously costly. The UMTS technology works at a higher
frequency than GSM (the current industry standard in Europe) to trans-
mit and receive information. While the first and second generation GSM
digital technology uses portions of the 900 and 1.800 MHz spectrum,
the third generation (UMTS) technology operates in the range of 2.000
MHz. There, each base station has a much shorter range. Roughly, UMTS
networks require 4-16 times as many base stations to manage a given
data flow as the established GSM networks. In addition, the higher data
flow associated with the new services that become available with UMTS
require even more stations to serve customers in a given area. As if this
were not enough trouble, more stations also raise health concerns about
radio emissions, and objections against the littering of the environment
with transmitters and radio masts.
After the main licenses have been awarded, industry observers predict
a major consolidation of the industry. Only those telecom companies
are expected to survive that have by now succeeded to establish a pan-
European network, without drowning in debt.12
11Several suppliers from the US, such as Lucent, Nortel and Cisco Systems, have
offered 100% financing, and European suppliers, like Nokia and Ericson, followed
suit. The latter are particularly vulnerable to requests for trade credits, because they
also benefit from a fast development of the UMTS network in their role as sellers of
third generation telephones.
12This may be slightly mitigated by arrangements that allow a joint construction and
use of base stations, especially outside major urban centers, which may save 20-40%
of the cost of the UMTS network. Such arrangements have already been approved in
Sweden, and some industry representatives now try to convince regulators to follow
the Swedish example, while others rightly object that this violates the terms set at the
auction.
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These observations alone explain why the main action took place in the
first auctions, which pretty much took the field, and attracted more com-
petition, and fiercer bidding. However, there are also systematic reasons
of auction design that explain why some of these European auctions,
culminating in the Swiss auction, performed so poorly.
6 Bad Luck or Bad Design?
In order to “establish market value”, as aimed at by the Federal Office of
Communications, it is not sufficient that the demand for radio spectrum
exceeds the supply. That demand must also give rise to sufficient bid-
der participation and bidding. The experience of the UMTS auctions in
Europe indicates that competition is not a good that potential bidders
provide for free. As a tendency, only those bidders will participate who
anticipate that they stand a good chance to obtain a license.
If the English auction rules are adopted, as they were in Switzerland, one
should expect that, as a tendency, the number of bidders is equal to the
number of licenses. Once it is clear who are the strongest bidders, weak
bidder should know beforehand that they will ultimately be squeezed out
anyway. As a consequence, licenses tend to be sold at nominal prices, as
it did happen in Switzerland.
During the first UMTS auctions in Europe there was still a great deal of
uncertainty about the seriousness and perseverance with which interna-
tional companies would try to penetrate the European market, and about
who succeeds to establish a pan-European mobile phone network. In ad-
dition, the capital market offered easy access to debt, and various high
flying business plans stimulated the imagination of potential bidders. In
this “gold rush” atmosphere, an overwhelming number of thirteen bid-
ders showed up in England to compete for just five licenses. In all later
auctions that were conducted according to the English rules — in the
Netherlands, in Italy, and finally in Switzerland — more and more weak
bidders withdrew already before the auction took place, after they had
learned with whom they would have to compete (see the third column in
Table 1).
A similar bidder “melt down” occurred under the auction rules applied in
Germany and Austria. In Germany, only 7 of the 12 qualified bidders did
actually participate in the auction. Nevertheless, the auction generated
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a more competitive market structure (six vs. five licenses) and more
revenue than in England.13
The English auction rules raise several questions: First of all, why should
a regulator know that precisely 5 licenses are welfare optimal? Of course,
no regulator can know this beyond reasonable doubt. Second, even if
one has some reason to desire that another competitor enters the mar-
ket, why exclude a market size of six licenses? Third, in the face of the
high distortions that are accompanied with regular taxes, the benefits of
more competition must be weighed against the benefits of raising more
revenue.
Without attempting to achieve an optimal mechanism that implements
the optimal mix of market size and revenue, it is fairly easy to improve
the English auction mechanism, by going in the direction of the rules
adopted in Germany. In Switzerland one could have broken down the
supply of spectrum into individual packages so as to allow bidders to
aggregate packages into either 4 or 5 licenses. This way one would have
assured at least four licenses, and yet would have reached more revenue
or more competition. Of course, even with these modified rules, one
would expect that, as a tendency, the number of active bidders is equal
to the equilibrium number of licenses. Nevertheless, this generally leaves
room for some competition for the size of licenses, which brings the price
closer to the aimed at “market value” or brings about a more competitive
market structure.
Altogether, this suggests that the Swiss UMTS auction flop was a result
of bad design combined with some unfavorable events, from the gen-
eral stalling of interest in UMTS licenses, to an apparently unanticipated
merger of one incumbent mobile phone company (diAX) with an estab-
lished service provider (Sunrise).
7 How to Improve Spectrum Auctions
In future auctions one should consider several modifications of currently
used auction procedures. Some changes can be applied immediately, oth-
13It should be mentioned that the German auction rules were strongly criticized
by Jehiel and Moldovanu [2000] and Moldovanu [2000a,b] as „an error with seri-
ous consequences”. They predicted that “the auction would most likely lead to four
licenses in the hands of the four incumbents”. This prediction was proven wrong.
Nevertheless, Klemperer [2000] echoed this negative verdict by claiming that the
auction result was „good luck, not good design”.
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ers require more basic research, and still others call for a new approach
to deal with the utilization of the radio spectrum.
There are at least three major problems and deficiencies that call for
improvements:
1. The coordination problem associated with letting bidders aggregate
their own licenses.
2. The demand reduction problem associated with the simultaneous,
ascending bid auction format.
3. The bidder participation problem that plagues spectrum auctions,
once bidders have a reasonably good idea of each others’ strength.
When one auctions frequencies rather than licenses, one may create the
coordination problems that have plagued the spectrum auctions in the
U.S. where bidders tried to coordinate to acquire connecting (possibly
nationwide) and neighboring frequencies (to minimize interference prob-
lems). In the face of these problems, several authors have advised to use
combinatorial auctions, in which bidders are asked to bid on all relevant
combinations of frequencies. However, this may raise the level of com-
plexity of bidding beyond practical feasibility.
In this regard, the designers of the German UMTS auction rules made an-
other useful contribution.14 Instead of auctioning concrete frequencies,
they auctioned “abstract” frequencies. In other words, the auctioneer as-
signed the concrete location of frequencies in the radio spectrum after
the auction, and this in such a way that the interests of bidders are taken
into account. Therefore, at the time of the auction, all frequencies were
identical (except for possible differences in size).15
However, in the German spectrum auctions bidders still faced a coor-
dination problem, because they had to decide on which of the num-
bered abstracts frequencies to place their bids. However, this coordi-
nation problem can easily be removed. Instead of asking for bids on the
14The auction was designed byWissenschaftliches Institut für Kommunikation (WIK).
15While this worked very well in the second-generation GSM spectrum auction in
Germany, it certainly was less effective in the GermanUMTS auction. Indeed, 8months
after the auction, the winners of the UMTS auction have not yet reached an agreement
on the allocation of frequencies. Some industry representative even say that they
would probably have preferred the auctioning of concrete frequencies, despite the
resulting coordination problems.
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numbered abstract frequencies, one should have employed an “ascend-
ing price clock auction” format. There, each bidder is asked to state his
demand for frequencies at the current uniform price per frequency. If
demand is equal to or below the given supply, the auction ends and bid-
ders get what they demanded; whereas if demand exceeds supply, the
unit price is raised uniformly by one increment, and the bidding proce-
dure is repeated.
We conclude that in order to remove the coordination problems that
plaguedmany spectrum auctions it is advisable to auction abstract rather
than concrete frequencies and thereby use an ascending price clock for-
mat. However, prior to the auction, one should lay out clear and complete
rules that govern the allocation of concrete frequencies, after the auction.
In the absence of such rules, the allocation is only postponed, which may
lead to costly delays.
Turning to the second problem, we mention that several observers of
spectrum auctions in the US, such as Weber [1997], have observed that,
in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction, bidders may find it in their
interest to strategically reduce aggregate demand while prices are still
low, relative to their valuations, and actually seemed to engage in such
bidding practices. A particularly strong case of such demand reduc-
tion occurred in the GSM auction in Germany, where the two dominant
firms split the available second-generations 1.800 MHz GSM frequencies
equally at low prices. And indeed, an analysis of this auction revealed,
that, under complete information, the simultaneous ascending-price auc-
tion has a unique perfect equilibrium that implements the efficient alloca-
tion at minimal prices (see Grimm, Riedel, andWolfstetter [2001a]).16
Somewhat similar results were obtained by Menezes [1996], Ausubel
and Schwartz [1999], and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [1998].
These results indicate, that the basic spectrum auction employed all over
the world, is not satisfactory. This suggests that more basic research is
needed to come up with a better basic design that generates more rev-
enue.
Finally, the third problem – that of insufficient bidder participation —
has already been on center stage in the present paper, because it was
particularly obvious in Switzerland. We have already mentioned that
changing the English auction rules by borrowing key ingredients from
16This is in contrast to Klemperer [2000] who interprets these events in the US
and in Germany as evidence of collusion and concludes that discouraging collusion
should be one of the two main issues of designing auction markets.
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the auction format employed in Germany and Austria would palliate this
problem. Indeed, starting for a given set of English rules, that prede-
termine the number and size of licenses, one can always improve these
rules by unbundling the licenses and repackage frequencies in such a
way that bidders can aggregate them into the same number of licenses
or one more. The outcome will be superior, provided one is interested
in more revenue or more competition. However, even if one intelligently
borrows from the German rules, limited bidder participation is likely to
remain a concern.
Rothkopf and Engelbrecht-Wiggans [1993] and Klemperer [2000]
have proposed that in order to increase bidder participation one should
consider switching from the open, ascending price auction to a one–
time sealed bid. Even if a a weak bidder stands no chance to win in
an open, ascending price auction, which is why he will not participate
in the first place, a one-time sealed bid gives him some chance to win,
and this chance may be sufficiently hight to justify participation. As long
as there is some uncertainty about the weak bidder’s valuation, the ad-
vantaged competitors balances the chances of winning against the profit
fromwinning. As a result, in equilibrium there is some probability that an
advantaged competitor loses and a disadvantaged bidder wins,17 which
may convince a weak bidder to participate, even though he would not do
so in an open, ascending price auction.
However, switching to a one-time sealed bid has at least two drawbacks.
First of all, it entails a deviation from efficiency. Indeed, the flip–side
of inducing weak bidders to participate is that they win with positive
probability — which destroys efficiency. Second, the open, ascending
price format is generally advised on the ground that it maximizes the
information available to bidders. In the final stages of the open, ascend-
ing auction the remaining bidders have observed the prices at which all
other bidders quit the auction, and from this they can infer their pri-
vate signals. In this sense, choosing an open, ascending auction format
can be viewed as a commitment device to an open information policy,
which minimizes the “winners’ curse” and thus leads to more aggressive
bidding, to the benefit of the auctioneer.18
17This intuition is confirmed by models of asymmetric auctions, where bidders’
valuations are drawn from commonly known but distinct probability distributions
(see Maskin and Riley [2000]), as well as in models which assume, perhaps more
appropriately in the present context, a commonly known ranking of valuations (see
Landsberger, Rubinstein, Wolfstetter, and Zamir [2001].
18While this principle works very well in the single-unit case, as shown in the seminal
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Luckily, there is another solution of the bidder participation problem.
However, it requires a radically new approach to deal with the utilization
of the radio spectrum altogether.
The key observation is that only some fraction of the available radio
spectrum is used formobile communication. Other, far heavier, users are
the radio broadcasting and especially television and satellite television
broadcasting industries. Only the small portion of the radio that was
made available for mobile communications, is auctioned; the bulk of the
radio spectrum is still given away for free to the broadcasting industry.
This suggests a simple way to radically solve the bidder participation
problem: Governments should simply auction the radio spectrum avail-
able for all uses in one single auction. This way, there would be competi-
tion not only among alternative suppliers of a mobile phone services, but
also among alternative uses of the radio spectrum – from mobile com-
munications to satellite television broadcasting. Another benefit of this
new approach is that the partitioning of the radio spectrum to alternative
uses would be determined by customers’ willingness to pay, rather than
by bureaucratic decree.
At first glance it may be the best procedure to establish flexible prop-
erty rights in spectrum, and auction perpetual and transferable property
rights, that allow its owners to freely adjust the use of the scarce radio
spectrum. This is particularly desirable if technological change and prod-
uct innovations bring about major but unpredictable reshuffling of the
demand for particular uses of the radio spectrum. On the other hand,
auctioning property rights does probably not contribute sufficiently to
solve the bidder participation problem, because once potential bidders
know each others’ ranking of valuations, the weak biddersmay withdraw,
just like they did in UMTS auctions.
Keeping the bidder participation problem in mind, it is better to restrict
bidders to particular uses of the spectrum, so that mobile phone oper-
ators and television stations can only use their frequencies for mobile
phone services and television broadcasting, respectively. However, the
entire radio spectrum must partitioned and leased in one auction,19 so
contribution by Milgrom and Weber [1982], it does not always work in multi-unit
auctions (see the counterexample by Perry and Reny [1999]).
19The leasing periods should be in the order of 10 to 15 years, in order to make
sure that the allocation of the radio spectrum can respond to changes in the demand
structure. Anyway, leasing is preferable to perpetual property rights also in order to
share the revenue among several generations of citizens.
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that the allocation of the radio spectrum to alternative uses becomes a
result of the auction, instead of being predetermined by the regulatory
process.
8 Conclusions
Altogether the Swiss UMTS auction flop has been caused by a combination
of unfortunate events and bad design. After the spectacular success
of the early UMTS auctions in Europe, interest in UMTS licenses stalled,
and the market conditions for financing licenses and the construction
of base station networks deteriorated. These developments could not
be anticipated. However, it should have been clear in advance that the
English design of the auction gives rise to insufficient entry, because once
potential bidders have learned to assess each other, the weak bidders
withdraw from the auction, leaving, as a tendency, only as many bidders
as licenses.
The English auction design was not the best design available. In fact, it
would have been fairly easy to improve this design, by borrowing some
key ingredients from the auction rules employed in Germany and Austria.
Even though one can improve the auction rules developed in England and
adopted inmost European UMTS auctions, by borrowing from the auction
rules employed in Germany and Austria, the task remains to design and
test better rules that strike the right balance between revenue andmarket
structure. In this regard, major improvements require the auctioning of
flexible property rights in the radio radio spectrum, and not only in the
portions of the spectrum set aside for mobile communications.
In any case, the poor performance of some European spectrum auctions
is no reason to return to the old “beauty contest” allocation of licenses,
even if it is combined with tough take-it-or-leave-it pricing, as it was tried,
unsuccessfully, in France.20
20There, four licenses were offered at the fixed price of FFr 32.5 billion each, and
the regulator promised to award these licenses to the four most qualified contestants.
However, when the bidding closed on January 31, 2001 only two firms had submitted
offers. (German Telekom and others withdrew already towards the end of the year
2000. France’s Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and its Spanish partner Telefonica backed
off just one week before the deadline, and Bouygues Telecom, which has German and
Italian partners, dropped out at the eleventh hour.) Evidently, once the number of
contestants had dropped to four, some of the remaining firms began to play a rene-
14
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